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Abstract Witnessing a growing number of increasingly au-
tonomous software agents we interact with or that operate on
our behalf under circumstances that are not fully known in
advance, we argue that there is a need to provide these agents
with moral reasoning capabilities. Looking at the current lit-
erature on behaviour constraints and multi-agent (software)
systems (MAS), one can distinguish various topics. The first
topic concerns the analysis of various forms of restraint and
their basis. This topic is at the core of moral philosophy.
The second topic concerns the formalized specification of,
and the reasoning about the constraints. The research on
this topic focuses predominantly on the use of logic, mostly
modal logic, and defeasible logic. The last topic is the MAS
and implementation related topic of designing a working
system in which there are rules that can be enforced and
deviant behaviour be detected.
Here we argue that all three topics need addressing
and strong integration. The moral philosophical analysis is
needed to provide a detailed conceptualization of the vari-
ous forms of behaviour constraint and direction. This analy-
sis goes beyond what is usual in the more technical/design
focus. The (modal) logic provides the rigour required to ul-
timately allow implementation. The implementation itself is
the ultimate objective. We outline the three components and
demonstrate how they can be integrated. We observe here
that we do not intend, or claim, that this moral reasoning is
on par with human moral reasoning. Our claim is that the
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analysis of human moral reasoning may provide a useful
model for constraining software agent behaviour. And, as
equally important, it is recognizable by humans which is an
important characteristic when it comes to ‘human–artificial
agent’ interaction. Recognizing and understanding the pre-
cise basis for the behaviour constraint in the artificial entity
will make the agent more trustful which, in its turn, will fa-
cilitate the acceptance of the use of and the interaction with
artificial agents.
Keywords Software agents · Morality · Modal logic ·
Trust · Deontic constraints · BDI
1 Introduction
Thinking about Human–Robot Interaction, quite a lot of ar-
tificial intelligent researchers have wished to build robots or
softbots that seem to think, feel and even live, and that it
would become possible that friends of these creatures can
share some of their lives with them [19]. We use the term
artificial agent to refer to both robots and softbots (or soft-
ware agents). In our paper we discuss software constructions
since morally reasoning in our current scope has no mater-
ial aspects except in the trivial sense of requiring computer
hardware to run on.
Looking at most practical research efforts however, this
optimistic picture turned out to be hard to achieve and re-
searchers often confined themselves to design agents with
just very limited and strongly context-dependent capabili-
ties like playing (just one type of) a game (like playing chess
[17]), searching a cheap air plane ticket or finding informa-
tion on a subject of your choice. We admit that, fortunately,
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more sophisticated research efforts are also available includ-
ing on (adaptive) negotiation agents for performing trans-
action in e-business [19] and agents that monitor all kinds
of (complex) systems like inventory systems, planning and
scheduling systems, and large computer networks [27].
When trying to design more complex human-like agents,
one rapidly encounters all kinds of additional issues that
should be dealt with including trust, emotion, adaptability,
agility, resilience and other both basic and fundamental ca-
pabilities [3, 7, 8]. Especially in circumstances with a lot
of vagueness and uncertainty where we admit autonomous
decision making by agents (e.g., automatic landing of an air-
plane under very difficult weather conditions or the decision
whether or not to close a storm surge barrier [21]), difficult
trade-offs should be made by these agents which may in-
clude difficult ethical considerations.
With respect to robot–human relationships trust is a key
concept. There are various modes in which humans and ar-
tificial agents can interact. First, humans can delegate ac-
tions to artificial agents, for example, buying goods, finding
information, protecting property. Second, humans process
the results from the delegated actions by evaluating them,
accepting or rejecting them, etc. Third, there is a form of
companionship in which human and artificial agents play a
game, talk and listen, or just share a physical space. This
is only a sketchy outline of what is possible. The overview
serves to illustrate that the notion of trust is present in each
of these modes of interaction. Looking at what it means to
trust and to be trustworthy there are several elements that
are at the core.1 Trust is an act or an attitude of the one who
is trusting someone or something else. Trustworthiness is a
property of the one, or the thing that is being trusted, the
trustee. Trusting something else means accepting a risk of
not getting what one was expecting the trustee to accom-
plish. This failure is not just due to an ability to deliver but
also to some form of betrayal. When a machine that is used
to accomplish something does not work one can feel disap-
pointed (one relied on the machine) but not betrayed. Be-
trayal needs not be limited to human–human relationships,
but can also apply to human–artificial agent relationships,
that is transcend beyond a simple use relationship. Another
element in trust is the expectancy of competency. For trust
to be warranted there must be a reasonable expectation that
the trustee is capable of executing the task that it is being
delegated. The expectation might be in part based on the in-
formation provided regarding earlier performances. If this
1Here also our aim is not to provide an analysis of the notion of trust.
We merely use it to demonstrate our approach. There are many dif-
ferent views. Our presentation is not meant as a position in a debate
on what trust is or involves. The presentation is informed by McLeod,
Carolyn, “Trust”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter
2006 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/win2006/entries/trust/.
information is misleading there is again reason to feel be-
trayed. Yet another element of trust, and a more controver-
sial one, is the intention of the trustee to act in accordance
with the expectations and to the good of the truster. This
might not be necessary. A truster that is motivated by a con-
tract or self-interest can properly execute the delegated task.
On all accounts the deontic constraints of the trustee are im-
portant in gaining the attribute of trustworthiness. Knowing
that it is under an obligation to preserve privacy, for exam-
ple, might restrain an artificial agent in disseminating infor-
mation that the truster provided.
The importance of the trust and morality motivated us
to start a research program that includes the investigation
of autonomous agents with moral reasoning and decision
making capabilities. In this paper, the focus is on morally
motivated behaviour constraint in artificial agents that are
acting in (quasi)-autonomous ways in all kinds of differ-
ent situations, in which their precise behaviour is usually
not completely known at design time. Their actions are cho-
sen at run-time under circumstances that could have been
foreseen, i.e., not have been analysed explicitly beforehand
when they were designed. Therefore, their behaviour might
have undesirable (possibly unintended) consequences. The
consequences might even be malicious. One way to partially
address this issue is by extending agents with a moral rea-
soning capability. This may be realized in the form of an in-
ternalised behaviour constraint (as we will elaborate below)
as opposed to a type of externalised behaviour constraint in,
for example, the use of reputation or behaviour enforcement.
Looking at the current literature on behaviour constraints
and multi-agent (software) systems (MAS), one can distin-
guish various topics. The first topic concerns the analysis of
various forms of restraint and their basis. This topic is at the
core of moral philosophy (see for example [16]). The second
topic concerns the formalized specification of, and the rea-
soning about the constraints. The research on this topic fo-
cuses predominantly on the use of logic, mostly modal logic
(see for example [6, 9–11, 20]), and defeasible logic (see for
example [12, 14]). The last topic is the MAS and implemen-
tation related topic of designing a working system in which
there are rules that can be enforced and deviant behaviour
that can be detected (see for example [2]).
In several publications one will find in-depth discus-
sions on one of these topics, with some tentative links to
the other ones. For example, Dastani et al. put strong em-
phasis on the modal logic modelling of agent behaviour.
The research has some links to implementation questions,
but that link is rather weak as is the link to moral philos-
ophy. Artakis, on the other hand, is very strong on MAS
and the implementation component. Its logical component
is less extensive, while the tie to moral philosophy is non-
existent. Wooldridge [25, 26] is very strong on the logical
aspect while the MAS focus is more on the conceptual level
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than on the actual implementation. There is no conceptual–
philosophical analysis to underpin the behaviour regulation.
The same goes for Georgeff [13].2
In this paper we argue that all three topics need address-
ing and strong integration. The moral philosophical analysis
is needed to provide a detailed conceptualization of the vari-
ous forms of behaviour constraint and direction. This analy-
sis goes beyond what is usual in the more technical/design
focus. The (modal) logic provides the rigour required to ul-
timately allow implementation. The implementation itself is
the ultimate objective. We outline the three components and
demonstrate how they can be integrated. We observe here
that we do not intend, or claim, that this moral reasoning
is on par with human moral reasoning, nor that it should
be like human moral reasoning. Our claim is at most that
the analysis of human moral reasoning may provide a use-
ful model for constraining software agent behaviour. And,
it is recognizable by humans, which is an important char-
acteristic when it comes to ‘human agent-software agent’
interaction.
Bringing the above-mentioned three topics together and
integrating them into one coherent approach is the goal of
this paper. In addition, we show how this approach can be
used to implement autonomous agents that have internal-
ized constraints on their behaviour in order to guard against
undesirable behaviour. During implementation we also look
at normative moral reasoning from a meta-level position.
With respect to morality we will disregard questions about
both its source (human, divine, etc.), its nature (natural prop-
erty, emergent characteristics, etc.) and its particular object
(human, animal, artificial, etc.). In our approach we focus
on moral knowledge and action, and their structure. We re-
late the knowledge about what is morally (un)acceptable to
the desires (goals) of the agents and the formation of in-
tentions (adaptation of plans) by agents. In order to do this
we use the belief-desire-intention model (BDI-model) by
Bratman [4, 5], and an extensive framework of modal logic,
DEAL. In this paper we only provide an informal descrip-
tion and not a complete formalization as the main goal is just
to demonstrate the integral approach. For testing purposes
some implementations are done using a particular multi-
agent software system named JACK [1]. In the paper we
represent some of this effort using pseudo-code.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In
section two, we sketch our integral approach. Section three
details the approach and focuses on the implementation us-
ing an example. Section four concludes the paper with a first
evaluation and outlook.
2We are fully aware that the above outline is a gross simplification and
far from complete. We hope for the current purposes it suffices to make
our point of the three components and the need for integration.
2 The Integral Approach
2.1 Moral Philosophical Considerations
To implement autonomous agents with moral reasoning ca-
pabilities based on internalized behaviour constraints, we
first need to choose an appropriate type of moral philosophy.
We first provide a rough characterization of moral philoso-
phy and some aspects that are pertinent when considering
implementation.
Moral philosophy has several branches, amongst which
meta-ethics, applied ethics and normative ethics. Meta-
ethics deals, amongst other things, with the possibility of
ethics, what moral knowledge is, and how it is possible, if
at all, to have moral knowledge. In our discussion, how-
ever, we just use ethics as a suitable model without having
to engage in the meta-ethical discussions on the possibility
of it because our targets are not human but artificial agents.
Therefore, meta-ethics is considered less relevant for our
purposes.
Applied ethics focuses on specific domains, such as med-
ical applications, environmental issues, etc. When it comes
to concrete MAS applications in specific domains, applied
ethics will be a useful field to draw upon. Here, in the con-
text of this paper however, the specific issues of applied
ethics do not play an important role yet. Hence, we will for
now leave applied ethics out of scope.
For our current general discussion, normative ethics
(which, roughly speaking, deals with what is to be consid-
ered as right and wrong conduct) provides us all the input we
need. Normative ethics itself can be divided into three broad
categories: teleological ethics, virtue ethics, and deontolog-
ical ethics. Teleological ethics looks at the consequences
of an act to evaluate it morally: ‘the outcome justifies the
action’. E.g., utilitarianism is a well-known form of teleo-
logical ethics.
Virtue ethics looks at the character traits of an individ-
ual for its moral evaluation. Wisdom, integrity and bravery
are well-known operators in virtue ethics. However, since
artificial agents are usually modelled in terms of concrete
actions they perform, virtue ethics seems to be farfetched
when discussing and evaluating the moral outcomes of their
behaviour. It is also doubtful whether the current technology
allows us to construct virtuous artificial agents.
In deontological ethics the focus is on the action or state
in its own right (‘killing is wrong’ and ‘lying is wrong’, no
matter what the consequences are). Kant is the best-known
representative of the approach. To understand why deonto-
logical ethics does offer a suitable tool for modelling moral
reasoning of artificial agents, we consider moral considera-
tions under two roles that are relevant in the context of be-
haviour direction. First, moral goals can be considered on
par with non-moral goals. ‘To do good’, such as helping the
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poor, can be a goal in itself. As such, they are taken into
consideration with other goals and, when using the same re-
source, subject to choice. Second, moral considerations can
also act as a constraint on actions. This concerns desiring
something but not doing it because the action itself, or some
aspects of the resulting state, are thought to be morally un-
desirable.
In our current context there are two differences between
teleological and deontological ethics that are very important.
First, teleological ethics requires an estimation of the out-
come of an action. In particular in complex situations this
adds a considerable cognitive burden which is much less
present for deontological considerations. Second, deonto-
logical theories allow more easily the exclusion of partic-
ular categories of actions. Since artificial agents (in the near
future) are most likely to be special purpose agents whose
primary focus is not on ‘doing good’ per se as moral bene-
factors but more on doing certain actions that do not violate
moral rules. The focus is on morally acceptable actions that
help us rather than explicitly improving the moral standard
of the places we live in. Our choice to start with deontolog-
ical ethics is thus based on pragmatic considerations rather
than moral philosophical ones.
Another aspect to observe is that an act or outcome is
never, or not completely, an act or outcome in its own right
or per se. The physical, biological act of uttering some
sounds has no moral bearings. It is only in the context of
two members of a, say an English speaking community, that
the utterance of sounds with a particular meaning becomes
an offensive, morally deplorable act. A moral outcome of a
given action is a particular aspect of a given situation that
is morally right or wrong. It is an attribute or predicate we
attach, or that is attached, or that is a property of the state.
So if you are yelled at unprovoked, you and anyone else
around will without any problem recognize this as morally
undesirable. The reason for raising this point is that for an
artificial agent this is far from trivial. Its sensors will detect
sounds and images without further moral qualification. And
it will perform acts without any moral consideration. Hence,
everything it does or senses will somehow have to be given
a moral weighing. The cognitive burden that is thus intro-
duced in the construction of well/behaved artificial agents
can hardly be underestimated.
The next aspect that is relevant is the distinction that can
be made between actions and moral judgements that are
immediate, and those that are meditated. By meditated we
mean that some explicit consideration process precedes the
actual decision to act or morally evaluate, whereas the in-
stinctive action is chosen and executed without further con-
sideration. For example, anyone witnessing the torture of an
animal will repulse and have an immediate moral evaluation
of the act. Whether to treat someone for an injury that re-
sulted from a reckless action and for which the person in
question cannot pay might require some explicit considera-
tion. A moral artificial agent will have to have various modes
of morally guided responses to allow for proper responses
in different situations. Of course, the particular application
will often help determine whether both modes are required
or not.
Above we have given some informal characterizations
of concepts that play an important role in moral reason-
ing. Concepts, moreover, that we believe help construct-
ing an approach to constrain the behaviour of autonomous
agents. Next, we discuss how these concepts can be formal-
ized, a necessary condition for subsequent implementation
of moral concepts.
2.2 Modelling
The first step towards implementation is the modelling of
the required behaviour. For this purpose, DEAL (deontic
epistemic action logic) is used in conjunction with the BDI-
model. These models consist of standard modal logic op-
erators. They are used as specification language. This pro-
vides a language to capture requirements that are stricter
than our everyday language, but more relaxed than the logic
reasoning with axiomatizing and theorem proving. Here we
provide a rudimentary overview only. For a more detailed
discussion the reader is referred to Van den Hoven and
Lokhorst [16], Wiegel [23, 24], Halpern [15], Moor [18].
Reasoning about what one knows or believes is captured
by epistemic logic, which has two operators: Bi (agent i be-
lieves that) and Ki (agents i knows that). Ki() states that
agent i knows that . Action logic has as its operator STIT ,
‘see to it that’. For example, [iSTIT : ] means that agent i
sees to it that  is done or brought about.
Deontic logic is the logic of obligations. The obligation
operator, O() it is obligatory that , is often taken as the
primitive operator. Others can be derived from this operator.
P(), it is permissible that , or alternatively ¬O(¬),
and F(), it is forbidden that , or alternatively O(¬),
(Van den Hoven and Lokhorst, [17, 284]). Further distinc-
tions are gratuitous actions G, ¬O() and optional actions
Opt, (¬O() ∧ ¬O(¬)).
For the formalization of the BDI-model, we follow
Wooldridge’s definitions [25]; (Bel i ) means i believes ,
(Int i ) means i intends , (Des i ) means i desires . In
addition to the modal logic operators, we use standard first-
order logic. This overlaps with the epistemic component of
DEAL.
All these elements can be combined to construct moral
propositions. Consider the following proposition, which is
for demonstration purposes only and not necessarily true or
a desirable property of an artificial agent:
Bi(G()) → O([i STIT ]) (1)
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This proposition means that if i believes that  is morally
good, then i should act in such as way that  is brought
about.
2.3 Implementation
To create support for the above modelling components we
use the following implementation elements from the JACK
development environment [1]:
• Beliefsets—beliefs representing the epistemic dimension
• Events—goals and desires, for the goal-directed behav-
iour
• Actions, plans and reasoning methods—representing the
intentions and action logic
• Agents—the container for the other elements
• Java programming language.
Beliefsets can be modelled using ‘open world’ and
‘closed world’ semantics. In closed world semantics some-
thing is either true or false. The open world semantics allow
something to be unknown. In the implementation the closed
world beliefsets contain only tuples that are true. Tuples that
are not stored are assumed false. In open world semantics
both true and false tuples are stored. Tuples not stored are
assumed unknown.
Desires, as represented by BDIGoalEvents in JACK,
are a special type of events. Events can be inter-agent or
intra-agent. The former represent the usual interaction be-
tween entities, the exchange of information, requests and an-
swers. The latter represents fine-grained internal reasoning
processes.
An agent has one or more plans at its disposal to achieve
its goals. A plan is a sequence of atomic acts that an agent
can take in response to an event. Committing to a plan,
choosing a plan is like forming an intention. There are po-
tentially several plans that can handle an event, and each
plan can handle only one type of event. In order to determine
which plan will handle an event (if any) there are two meth-
ods: relevance() and context(). The relevance() method de-
termines which instances (all or some) of an event type can
be handled. An event can carry various information which
allows the relevance() method to determine whether or not
to handle the event. From all relevant plans, the context()
method determines next which are applicable. The context
method is a logical expression that tries to bind the plan
logical members. For each binding a plan instance will be
created.
A plan can have some meta information associated to it—
accessible through PlanInstanceInfo(). This can be a rank-
ing number that can be given a cardinal or ordinal interpreta-
tion. This information can be used to reason at a meta-level
in case there are multiple, applicable plans.
Having presented the basic elements needed for imple-
menting autonomous agents with certain moral reasoning
capabilities, we finally propose a methodology consisting of
four steps in order to achieve a successful implementation.
The four steps are:
(1) modelling of moral knowledge;
(2) building up a moral knowledge base which includes the
mechanism for classifying actions and states under a
particular moral view;
(3) integrating these components into the non-moral actions
and states;
(4) adding meta-level, moral reasoning to make trade-offs
between exclusive actions or outcomes.
In the next section, we illustrate the use of the integral




Consider the following, simplified, example. A hospital de-
ploys artificial agents as medical data assistant to the physi-
cians. The medical data assistant’s duties comprise liaising
with the patient, the patient’s GP and the insurer. Assume
further that the patient is not well insured and is poor, with
a large family to maintain. Providing all patient data might
allow the insurer to establish that the patient is not covered
for a particular operation, in which case the patient cannot
pay for it and the chances of the hospital having to forfeit
payment increase. In this simple example we have to con-
sider only one action: ‘providing information’. As we ar-
gued above, an action is never completely a moral action in
its own right but is context-dependent. The same action of
providing information in this case can—depending on the
precise context of who is informing who—be obligatory and
forbidden, e.g., when it concerns patient data provided to the
GP and to the insurer respectively. Furthermore we observe
that an obligation to tell the truth does not automatically im-
ply an obligation to inform (the insurer, for example). So
this one single action of ‘providing information’ has many
different moral aspects: duty to protect privacy, an obliga-
tion to inform the GP, a prohibition to inform the insurer,
a prohibition to lie.
A choice the designer has to make is how to model these
considerations under an appropriate normative ethical view.
A teleological agent might decide that overall, the situation
of the patient’s family, the hospital’s financial situation, etc.
makes it permissible to withhold certain information. In the
same way, in other situations the agent might decide to not
uphold the privacy protection because that serves the overall
benefit optimisation.
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Under a deontological approach, however, these compli-
cated considerations can be left out. Providing private pa-
tient data to the insurer is forbidden, providing the insurer
with accurate data on the operation is obligatory, etcetera.
These relatively simple considerations help to constrain the
possible actions of information provision in a hospital en-
vironment. The overall set of obligations, permissions, with
their conditions, the sub/sets of data they refer to, in constel-
lations of many actors with many roles is complex already.
We argue that this latter, deontological approach will
prove hard enough but doable. In gaining user acceptance
of the use of robots and softbots in relation to humans it
seems wise to err on the cautious side and build a robust ap-
proach that gains trust by not abusing information provided
and applied through robots and softbots. Once proven reli-
able it can be extended with various other modes of moral
consideration.
The importance of a robust approach can further be illus-
trated by extending the example. Consider the situation in
which paramedical staff gets involved. The designer might
not have foreseen it, or his sponsor might not have deemed
it necessary to consider them at the time. Now suddenly, the
medical data assistant has to consider the paramedics that
are assisting our patient, who has had a car accident, and is
being given first-aid on the spot. Or, consider the situation
in which the patient was insured with a direct writer, but has
recently switched to a broker mediated insurer. What is the
status of the broker?
In this section we consider the ways to approach this ap-
plication, and outline the impact of the various choices that
can be made. Of course, as this is not the actual design, our
outline will be necessarily incomplete and rough.
3.2 Modelling Moral Knowledge
Moral knowledge is modelled as an n-tuple beliefset with a
series of attributes. The main of these are:
(1) the logical proposition;
(2) the validity domain, called the sphere loosely following
Walzer’s [22] use of the term sphere;
(3) a type indicator allowing the distinction between moral
orientation (e.g. teleological or deontological orienta-
tion);
(4) the type of the object of the logical proposition will help
classifying the proposition;
(5) a truth indicator.
1. Listing ‘beliefset MoralObligations’
public beliefset MoralObligations extends
OpenWorld {
#key field String strObligationName
#key field String strSphere
#value field String strMoralProposition
#value field String strType
....
}
The moral knowledge itself can be formulated as follows.
To model the obligation to inform the GP on a change in the
state of the health of the patient, we define  as a change
in the state of the patient health, STITα as an action α to
inform, and the state A as A def= Kg meaning that the state
A describes that g knows , where g is a group of agents or
humans. Then the obligation to inform can be described as
follows:
O(Bi() → ([i STITα: A])). (2)
Statement (2) can be read as follows: If agent i believes the
change of state , then it has an obligation to act, namely to
inform such that state A (here describing that group g knows
) is established through action α. Note that the action, to
inform, is defined here in terms of the resulting state that g
knows . In the above formalization, the action is obligatory
and not the state. The group g would be defined in terms
of the relationship with the patient by using an appropriate
predicate logic definition of ‘IsPhysicianTo’.
In a similar way, the fact that it is permissible to inform
all paramedic staff (group h) with information φ can be for-
malized as
¬O(Bi() → ([i STITα: A−])) where A− def= ¬Khφ. (3)
Next, there are two key decisions to make. The first one
is the decision whether we model the chosen beliefset un-
der openworld or closedworld semantics, and the second
one concerns the choice which operator to take as primi-
tive. Let us consider obligations under closedworld seman-
tics first. Every tuple in the beliefset is true by definition.
This covers all obligations, O(), and everything forbidden
O(¬). Every tuple that is not in the beliefset is false by
definition, and thus either gratuitous, ¬O(), or permissi-
ble ¬O(¬). This approach results in a rather permissive
set-up because it might be very hard, even in a limited appli-
cation domain, to list everything that is forbidden. As long
as something is not explicitly forbidden or obligatory the
agent is free to act. In our example, with the case of privacy
protection, this seems too permissive.
Taking permission, P(), as the primitive operator gives
the exact opposite. All positive tuples are either permissi-
ble or gratuitous. Under closedworld semantics this is a re-
strictive form: if it is not allowed it is forbidden. This might
be a very suitable option in our example. Everyone, who
is allowed to be informed, is listed, and, per default, any-
one who is not listed is not allowed to know. However, there
might be exceptions on these rules needed. For example, in
the case of an accident, paramedics may need information,
which shows that this approach might be too restrictive.
In an openworld semantics the status of the proposition is
undetermined. This means that a state that is not in the data-
base might be obligatory or gratuitous, forbidden or permis-
sible. This situation makes sense only if the agent is given
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the ability to search for additional information that will al-
low it to classify a proposition. If the additional information
is not available or inconclusive, one has to fall back to as-
signing the proposition a truth value on some other basis or
by default. The openworld semantics is more permissive and
allows for situation of greater degree of uncertainty and in-
dependent acting on the side of the agent. Taking P as the
primitive operator in an openworld semantics helps taking
away some edges of the restrictive nature requiring not only
to list everything that is gratuitous and permissible, but also
everything that is explicitly forbidden. But that might be dif-
ficult as we pointed out above.
Under openworld semantics (ow) the choice for the oper-
ators O or P is equivalent. It would be equivalent for closed-
world semantics (cw) if it is possible to exhaustively list all
relevant states and actions. The very reason for undertaking
the effort to extend agents with moral reasoning capability,
however, is the very fact that it often is not possible to do.
We further observe here that by arranging the options
from least to most restrictive, we get:
Ocw > Oow = Pow > P cw. (4)
Agents have particular goals (desires) they want to
achieve. Given that the agent has a view of the resulting
state, it needs to evaluate the means (actions) by which these
goals can be achieved in moral terms. The approach is to
take these actions and run them against the knowledge base
of permissible states. The tuple of permissions will contain
a query. The envisioned state provides the input parameters
and the query returns a boolean indicating whether the out-
come or action is permitted.
Let us look at the above example. Lying, intentionally
misinforming, is an undesirable trait that can be functional
in achieving the agent’s goal of increasing the chances of
the hospital receiving the money for the treatment. How
can an intention, that is a plan that the agent has chosen,
be checked for its moral admissibility? We model lying as
informing other agents or humans about a state  that the
agent believes to not hold true, ¬. A generalized check
would consist of checking all information provided to other
agents or humans against the agent’s knowledge base (be-
liefsets). The moral knowledge base contains propositions
as defined above.
The next question is how the agent knows that a partic-
ular action comes under the Inform action-type in the be-
liefset. Here we have two options. If the agents are equipped
with strong cognitive capabilities they can learn how to clas-
sify actions. They would learn that informing basically con-
sists of a source, one or more targets, some information, etc.
The other option is to strong type actions to allow classi-
fication. This requires more upfront design effort. Action-
types would have to be determined upfront at design-time,
while the actual actions and their typing can be done at run-
time. The cognitive demands in this approach are consider-
ably less. The basic moral rules would be defined upfront.
As this is meta-level definition of permissible, obligatory,
etc. actions or states, it allows ample room for uncertainty
at design time. Strong typing would allow agents to classify
their plans at run time under a moral regime.
We hope to have already demonstrated with the above
analysis of moral knowledge that already relatively sim-
ple considerations lead to complex modelling questions and
decisions. It will also be clear that though some of these
considerations might easily apply to humans, they do not
to robots and softbots. Moral philosophy and modal logic
provide a powerful toolset for designers wishing to include
moral considerations into their design.
3.3 Connecting Moral Knowledge to Intentions
An intention in the BDI-model is a plan that the agent has
committed to. Before making the commitment, i.e. choos-
ing a plan, the agent should evaluate the various plans that
are available on the moral merits. Each plan has a con-
text() method. This method contains a logical proposition
with logical variables. This allows us to run the proposi-
tion against beliefsets and find bindings for the logical vari-
ables. If the plan contains information provision, the plan
is typed as informing. The information to be provided is
matched against the agent’s beliefset. The structure of the
plan and the values are matched against the permissions be-
liefset which will indicate whether the plan is morally per-
missible. The permission can be contingent on the applica-
tion domain (sphere). What is permissible in one context
may be impermissible in another, given the roles of the ac-
tors involved, the object of the data, etc.
In our approach, the context method contains a check
against the moral knowledge database and returns the propo-
sition we have modelled above. Together with the value of
the information to be provided and a logical variable that
is run against the agent’s beliefsets, the proposition would
evaluate the moral admissibility of the plan. If there would
be no binding for the logical variable, this indicates that the
agent does not hold this piece of information to be true.
The implementation of proposition (3) would contain at
least three elements. First, a beliefset containing the infor-
mation the agent holds to be true (or false). Second, a be-
liefset containing the deontic constraints. Third, a plan to do
something. This plan also contains the context() method.
The beliefset ‘MoralObligations’, listed above, is
extended with a query to check the intended action against
the moral constraints. It checks whether the intended plan
comes under a particular action-type for which there are
moral constraints, and whether the agent consider the infor-
mation it wishes to communicate to be true.
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2. Listing ‘beliefset MoralObligations
with query function’




(String strType, boolean bAct);
#complex query boolean getObligation
(String strAct, String strType){
boolean bAct;
return getAct(String strAct,
String strType, boolean bAct) &&
getTrue(String strData, boolean bTrue);
}




The context() method would make a reference to the
above believe set and check its relationship beliefset to es-
tablish, for example, the relationship between the data ob-
ject and the intended receiver of the information. Patient in-
formation can be transferred to the attending physician but
not to the insurer. The context() method is a logical propo-
sition containing queries against the beliefsets. The belief-
set queries return a logical truth value. Only if the complete
proposition evaluates as true will the plan be executed.
In our example we have a so-called negative duty (the
obligation to refrain from doing something, i.e. from inform-
ing the insurer about private medical patient data), and a pos-
itive duty (the obligation to do something, i.e. to inform the
patient’s GP). The implementation strategy outlined above
concerns the negative duties. The implementation of pos-
itive duties is in fact much easier. It consists of having a
plan to respond to an event or state. A change in patient data
does trigger an event, an observer that is attached to the data.
This event in turn is handled by the agent that does have a
plan to respond to the event, see for a more detailed descrip-
tion [24].
The challenge is designing multi-agent systems in which
agents cooperate, either as parts of one larger system (also
an agent in our terminology), or as ad-hoc co-operators, is
to restrain the behaviour of the system at macro-level. Re-
stricting the execution of individual plans is one thing; but
if these plans call on other plans, calling in turn on other
plans chosen at run-time, it becomes rather difficult. This
issue has, to our knowledge, not yet been addressed at any
length in a satisfactory fashion. Also in the current approach
there is no more than an outline yet. Our initial approach
is to have an execution of plans in a ‘sand-box’ where the
outcomes are checked against the initial restraints defined in
the originating plan before the actual execution is allowed.
For the current purposes further discussion is out scope.
We highlight it though as an important aspect for future re-
search.
3.4 Meta-Level Reasoning
The last element to consider here is the situation in which
goals and moral considerations are not compatible. It can be
that either the agent cannot achieve its goal without break-
ing a moral rule, or, there are conflicting moral obligations,
permissions, etc. Before discussing how to address this is-
sue we need to describe the mechanism by which agents
select the plans that potentially serve its purpose. A goal
and an event are the two basic triggers to bring an agent
into action. In response to the triggers all plans that are rel-
evant are gathered using a relevant() method. Next, the con-
text() method is executed, which further restricts the set of
available plans for consideration. If there remain multiple
plans, the agent has three basic mechanisms: prominence,
precedence and meta-level reasoning. Prominence refers to
the order in which the plans are hard wired into the agents’
make-up. This constitutes some equivalent of our immediate
responses. Precedence is the mechanism by which the plans
are ordinally ranked. This reflects a considered hierarchy of
obligations, permissions, etc. The meta-level reasoning al-
lows the agent to gather additional information and reason
about which plans to adopt. If there are conflicting moral
considerations, and there is no predefined hierarchy, there
are moral mechanisms to deal with this. The lying would
be caught as impermissible to start with. The conflicting re-
maining obligations can be dealt with by using the moral
algorithms at meta-level reasoning. To support the actual de-
sign of such reasoning and ranking algorithms, there is am-
ple literature in the field of moral philosophy dealing with,
for example prima facie duties, value commensurability, re-
flective equilibrium, etc.
If the set of plans is empty, due to the moral restrictions
in the context() method the agent cannot act. This may, of
course, seem unsatisfactory, but it might have been exactly
the purpose: not allowing the available action to execute be-
cause they violate some obligations is what was intended
from the start. The designer might also decide to adopt a
less restrictive model of behaviour constraint and determine
to reconsider the plans using the meta-level reasoning mech-
anism.
4 Conclusions and Future Research
We have argued that constraining behaviour of agents in
multi-agent systems is a necessary feature to make them
more acceptable to their human counterparts. Behaviour
constraints can take many forms: permissions and obliga-
tions to do something, duties, gratuitous actions, optional
actions, etc. This is a complicated domain of analysis. Be-
haviour constraint and direction is the core subject matter of
moral philosophy. Taking moral philosophy as the starting
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point of the analysis provides us with a well analysed set
of concepts that defines the concepts and their relationships.
Even though to aim is not to create human morality in an
artificial setting, the concepts are considered as very useful.
Moral philosophy, however, is seldom defined in suffi-
cient precise terms and relationships to be directly useful
for the implementation in multi-agent systems. The con-
necting bridge, as it were, between moral philosophy and
multi-agent systems is formed by the modal logic frame-
work DEAL, and the BDI-model. The feasibility of this
approach is demonstrated through the pseudo code in the
JACK agent software.
The analysis of moral knowledge shows that there is a
wide range of modes to model moral knowledge. The impact
of using obligations as the primitive operator in conjunction
with closedworld semantics wields a very restrictive model,
in contrast to a permission based model with openworld se-
mantics.
Our integral approach provides a complete approach
from theory to software implementation of constraints on
agent behaviour. It has a well-founded theoretic base, a for-
mal expression in two models, and a demonstrated imple-
mentation facility.
As presented, our approach still contains various white-
spots and drawbacks. In this paper we restricted ourselves to
a particular branch of normative ethics: deontological ethics.
This branch focuses on the permissibility of actions as such
without reference to the outcome. In particular application
settings this will be sufficient and adequate. Other applica-
tions, however, might require different considerations. This
is demonstrated through the approach to side-effects. A de-
ontological approach to norms disregards the outcomes in
the evaluation of an act. Thus, side-effects do not enter into
the account. In a teleological approach they feature promi-
nently in the evaluation of an action. Deontological moral
theories form a long standing tradition and it is one of the
main branches of moral philosophy. It provides a good start-
ing point for the reasoning about and modelling of moral
knowledge and behaviour restraints. The complexity of our
relatively simple application shows the importance of en-
gaging moral philosophy into the design of multi-agent sys-
tems. System designers might automatically be drawn to-
wards a particular approach without knowing the impacts
of this (implicit) choice. As one of the next steps teleologi-
cal analysis needs to be included as well in our framework.
Without it the framework is not complete and applications
are necessarily more limited. Certain applications will re-
quire an evaluation of the outcomes. This goes also for the
mechanism to compare and rank conflicting obligations, du-
ties, rights, etc. The explicit modelling of concrete mecha-
nisms is something we have not touched upon in this pa-
per, an omission we are well aware of and that needs to be
addressed in future research. Another issue for further at-
tention is a development of moral epistemology in artificial
contexts. Strong typing actions, knowledge, etc. is currently
the chosen option, but it is limiting in potential width of the
application domain.
Further research will need to look into moral learning
and the development of more powerful cognitive algorithms.
This is certainly not a trivial exercise and still much needs
to be done in order to create artificial agents with dedicated
moral reasoning capabilities that can be trusted and, there-
fore, be used in all kinds of practical, usually dynamic situ-
ations of life. We wish to suggest here that the development
of artificial moral agents within specific, well-focused do-
mains should be tried first since in these specific domains,
we expect the solution spaces to be relatively small and the
complexity of moral reasoning solutions more manageable.
In order to realize general acceptance of artificial agents
through enhanced moral reasoning capabilities, a lot of test-
ing is needed where agents may be used in an advisory role
first, before we trust them with full decision-making power.
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